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Foreign aid encourages trade liberalization when given to
politically insecure leaders
Can foreign aid be a useful tool to promote trade liberalization? In new research which studies 66
autocracies over two decades, Daniel Yuichi Kono and Gabriella R. Montinola find that foreign
aid does encourage trade liberalization – but only in countries where leaders are politically
insecure. They write that the less chance that an autocratic leader has of staying in power, the
greater the effect of aid on tariff reductions.
Foreign aid remains a controversial topic. Some argue that foreign aid can reduce poverty and
promote economic development. Others believe that it encourages corruption and props up
unsavory regimes. Still others argue that aid can have either positive or negative effects,
depending on the political circumstances of donors and recipients. Although a growing body of
research supports this third perspective, the effects of foreign aid remain very much in dispute.
One question that continues to preoccupy policymakers is whether foreign aid can encourage
market-oriented policy reform. International financial institutions such as the International
Monetary Fund have long sought to promote such reform by attaching policy conditions to aid.
Since 2001, the United States has provided more than $6 billion in aid to encourage developing countries to
reduce trade and investment barriers. In general, conditioning aid on policy reform has not worked: recipients
typically disregard such conditions once they receive the aid. However, aid could promote reform in other ways.
For example, recipient governments could use the money to buy off or repress opponents of reform.  In new
research, we investigate this alternative channel.
We argue that foreign aid can promote trade liberalization, an important type of market reform. However, it does
so only when recipient leaders are short-sighted: that is, when they are focused on their immediate political
survival. This is because the costs and benefits of trade liberalization are realized at different times. The costs are
immediate: for example, import-competing industries lose profits and jobs. The benefits are more distant: for
example, economic output may be higher once the economy adjusts and workers find new jobs in more
competitive sectors. These differently timed effects have important implications for the incentives to liberalize
trade. Politically secure leaders have stronger incentives to liberalize, as they expect to remain in power to enjoy
the resulting benefits. Politically insecure leaders have weaker incentives to liberalize, as they are unlikely to
survive the short-term adjustment costs. All things equal, we thus expect politically secure leaders to be more
likely to liberalize trade.
The cost implications of trade liberalization matter because the effects of foreign aid depend on leaders’ prior
incentives.  Politically secure leaders liberalize trade even in the absence of aid. As a consequence, aid does not
make them any more liberal. In contrast, politically insecure leaders do not liberalize in the absence of aid.
However, by allowing them to repress or buy off political opponents—in other words, by making them more secure
—foreign aid can encourage insecure leaders to liberalize trade.  We thus hypothesize that foreign aid promotes
trade liberalization only when given to politically insecure leaders.
To test this hypothesis, we examined how leaders’ survival prospects affect the relationship between foreign aid
and national tariff rates. Our measure of survival prospects was developed by Joseph Wright and is the predicted
probability that a given leader will remain in power in a given year. Foreign aid is logged official development
assistance as a percentage of gross domestic product, while tariffs are average statutory tariff rates. Our sample
encompassed 66 autocracies from 1982 to 2002: we focused on autocracies because Wright’s measure was
developed for autocrats and cannot easily be extended to democrats.
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that foreign aid leads to significantly lower tariffs only when leaders are
politically insecure. Our results are summarized in Figure 1. The horizontal axis shows leaders’ probabilities of
staying in power, while the vertical axis shows the impact of foreign aid on national tariff rates. The solid line
indicates our estimate of aid’s effects, while the shaded area represents the 90-percent confidence interval.
Figure 1 – Foreign Aid, Survival Prospects and Tariffs
As shown in Figure 1, when leaders have only an 80 percent chance of surviving, a one-unit increase in logged
aid leads to a 45-percentage point reduction in tariffs. This effect dwindles, however, as leaders become more
secure, becoming statistically insignificant when leaders have a 92 percent chance of surviving (about the tenth
percentile of our sample). Because the variation in logged aid is small—the standard deviation is only 0.66—these
estimates overstate the typical impact of aid. However, a one-standard deviation increase in logged aid leads to
tariff reductions of 30 percentage points at the sample minimum, 11 percentage points at the fifth percentile, and 7
percentage points at the tenth percentile. The substantive effects of foreign aid are thus intuitively reasonable: aid
promotes tariff liberalization in about ten percent of our sample, and within this subsample, it leads to major
liberalization in a few cases but modest liberalization in most.
Our results suggest that aid donors who wish to encourage policy reform can do so more effectively by targeting
aid toward politically insecure leaders. We hasten to add that these leaders may not use the aid itself effectively—
in fact, our argument assumes that insecure leaders use aid to prop up their rule rather than for poverty reduction
or economic development. Building on this point, Joseph Wright has shown that politically secure leaders are
more likely than insecure ones to invest aid productively. Whether donors should target aid toward secure or
insecure regimes may thus depend on what kind of policy response they are seeking—and specifically on whether
they want the aid to be spent well or to influence policy choices in other domains. In any case, the results
presented here should help lead to more informed decisions about aid allocation.
This article is based on the paper, ‘Foreign Aid, Time Horizons, and Trade Policy’, in Comparative Political
Studies.
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